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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In 2016, the Senate passed its annual defense funding bill, the 
National Defense Authorization Act, with a provision that would re-
quire women to register with the Selective Service.1 Senator John 
McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, strong-
ly supported the measure.2  Although the amendment was defeated in 
the House of Representatives, it received backing from the House 
Armed Services Committee.3 At the same time, lawsuits filed in Cali-
                                                                                                                       
 * Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy, West 
Point. The author is a former active duty Army Judge Advocate. Many thanks to Lieutenant 
Colonel Christopher Jacobs and Lieutenant Colonel Winston Williams for helpful comments 
and suggestions. The views expressed here are the author’s personal views and do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the United States Army, the United States 
Military Academy, or any other department or agency of the United States government. 
 1. S. 2943, 114th Cong. § 591 (as passed by Senate, June 14, 2016); see Jennifer Stein-
hauer, Senate Votes to Require Women to Register for the Draft, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/us/politics/congress-women-military-draft.html?_r=0. 
 2. Senator John McCain stated, “The fact is . . . every single leader in this country, 
both men and women, members of the military leadership, believe that it’s fair since we 
opened up all aspects of the military to women that they would also be registering for [the] 
Selective Service.” Steinhauer, supra note 1. 
 3. Nicholas Clairmont, The Unseemly Death of an Amendment to Draft Women,  
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/the-
unlikely-birth-and-unseemly-death-of-an-amendment-to-draft-americas-women/483599/ 
[https://perma.cc/TKJ9-PWWF]. California Republican Duncan Hunter, a strong opponent 
of women serving in combat roles, originally proposed the amendment. He then voted 
against his own proposal. Id. 
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fornia and New Jersey challenged the continued constitutionality of 
the all-male Selective Service law as it currently stands.4    
 From an equal rights perspective, the exclusion of women from 
Selective Service registration places an undue burden on men, who 
not only face forcible conscription but a myriad of criminal and civil 
penalties for failing to register.5  From a feminist viewpoint, the  
current law may be seen as a government-endorsed affirmation that 
women must be shielded from the obligations of full participation in 
civic life, justifying unequal treatment in American society.6 The re-
newed wave of interest in the Selective Service system, both in the 
political and legal arenas, largely springs from the implementation of 
the new Pentagon policy to allow women to fill combat roles, ending 
the so-called combat exclusion rule.7   
 Undoubtedly, the lifting of the combat exclusion policy will have 
significant ramifications on a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause8  
analysis of the male-only Military Selective Service Act (MSSA or the 
Act).9 Ultimately, however, the Pentagon’s decision to open combat 
roles to women will not be totally dispositive in a legal challenge to 
the Act. As this Article explores, the degree of judicial deference 
granted to Congress and the military on the question of women’s ex-
clusion from the draft will play an essential role in future judicial 
review of the Act. 
                                                                                                                       
 4. See Kristina Davis, Suit Over Women in the Draft Back in Action, SAN DIEGO  
UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sdut-
women-register-draft-9th-circuit-opinion-2016feb19-story.html [http://perma.cc/8CGP-
FHHL]; Ilya Somin, Lawsuit Challenges Constitutionality of Male-Only Draft Registration, 
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/15/lawsuit-challenges-constitutionality-of-male-only-draft-
registration/?utm_term=.3c88c81b23e4 [https://perma.cc/689M-7HPH]. The first lawsuit 
was filed by the National Coalition for Men; the second by a teenage girl and her mother—both 
claiming that the Military Selective Service Act unconstitutionally discriminates based on sex.   
 5. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.    
 6. See Linda K. Kerber, “A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . . . Ladies”: Wom-
en, Civic Obligation and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 119-23; 
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 293-94 (1984).   
 7. Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y of Def., on Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat 
Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Dempsey Memorandum], 
https://www.defense.gov/news/WISRJointMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M9N-X6WY]. The 
decision was announced in 2013 by then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and fully imple-
mented within the armed services on January 1, 2016.   
 8. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 
preclude the federal government from denying persons equal protection under the law, 
effectively incorporating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See  
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).   
 9. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3820 (2012). 
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 This Article begins with a brief historical overview of the MSSA 
and the 1981 Supreme Court case Rostker v. Goldberg,10 in which the 
Court upheld the Act against a due process challenge. The Rostker 
decision has faced widespread criticism for its constitutional analy-
sis.11  Indeed, the level of deference granted to Congress regarding the 
exclusion of women was remarkable, and many scholars agree that 
this degree of deference ultimately overcame a probing and meaning-
ful due process analysis by the Court.12  Next, this Article briefly ex-
amines the Supreme Court’s history of using judicial deference in 
military-related cases. Most important for a future legal challenge, 
however, is the recent trend in the Court’s jurisprudence. This Article 
then explores recent cases in which the government argued for mili-
tary deference and the Court’s evolving approach to these cases. Fi-
nally, focusing on precedent in the last fifteen years, beginning with 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) cases and going through First 
Amendment challenges from recent terms, this Article attempts to set 
a framework of deference for a modern-day challenge to the MSSA. 
II.   HISTORY OF THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 
 During the Civil War, President Lincoln signed the Enrollment 
Act,13 marking the first time the federal government required com-
pulsory military service of able-bodied males.14 Congress has enacted 
multiple draft laws since that time, resulting in the conscripted ser-
vice of over 16 million American men during twentieth-century con-
flicts alone.15 The current draft registration law, the MSSA, was 
passed by Congress in 1967.16 Conscription for the Vietnam conflict 
ended in 1973, however, and mandatory registration ended in 1975, 
effectively putting the Selective Service Registration System into 
standby mode.17   
 Prompted by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
President Carter called for the reactivation of the draft registration 
                                                                                                                       
 10. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). As the Rostker Court inexorably linked the requirement to 
register with the actual requirement for conscripted service, this Article does the same.   
 11. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.   
 12. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 13. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).   
 14. KRISTY N. KAMARCK, CONG. RES. SERV., R44452, THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 
AND DRAFT REGISTRATION: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2016). 
 15. Induction Statistics, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/About/History-
And-Records/Induction-Statistics [https://perma.cc/MAA6-UYCY] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) 
(providing total induction numbers for each conflict when the United States used the 
draft). The estimated numbers include 2.8 million servicemen in World War I, 10.1 million 
in World War II, 1.5 million in Korea, and 1.8 million in Vietnam. Id.   
 16. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-400, 81 Stat. 100 (1967).   
 17. KAMARCK, supra note 14, at 11.   
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process.18 He asked Congress to fund the reactivation of the Selective 
Service System and also recommended that Congress amend the 
MSSA to allow the registration and conscription of women.19 After 
holding lengthy hearings that included testimony from multiple  
Pentagon officials, Congress agreed that it was appropriate to reacti-
vate the draft registration process.20 The funding amount allocated by 
Congress was significantly less than requested by President Carter, 
however, as Congress determined that only males should be included 
in registration.21 The MSSA has been amended several times since its 
inception, but its essential requirement, that males between the ages 
of eighteen and twenty-six register for the draft, remains.22   
A.   Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) 
 Shortly after the renewal of the registration process, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Rostker, which presented a Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause challenge to the MSSA. The district court 
struck down the law, finding that contrary to Congress’s official find-
ings and the arguments proffered by the government, the bulk of mil-
itary congressional testimony showed that women’s inclusion in draft 
registration would further the military’s interest, not detract from 
it.23 In that way, the lower court found that the government failed to 
                                                                                                                       
 18. President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1980), 
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml  
[https://perma.cc/85JL-3V8E].   
 19. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 60 (1981).   
 20. Id. at 61 (citing H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 94 Stat. 552 (1980)). 
21. Id. (first citing S. REP. NO. 96-789, at 1-2 (1980); then citing 126 CONG. REC. 
13,895 (1980) (statement of Sen. Nunn)).   
22. 50 U.S.C. § 3802(a) (2012). The law states, in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be the duty of every male 
citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United 
States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registra-
tion, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and 
submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such 
manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules 
and regulations prescribed hereunder.  
Id. It goes on to state that:  
The President is authorized, from time to time, whether or not a state of war ex-
ists, to select and induct into the Armed Forces of the United States for training 
and service in the manner provided in this chapter (including but not limited to 
selection and induction by age group or age groups) such number of persons as 
may be required to provide and maintain the strength of the Armed Forces. 
Id. § 3083(a). 
 23. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The district court also 
found it problematic that Congress displayed conflicting positions on women’s usefulness in 
the military. At the same time as it continued to increase funding to recruit more women 
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show an important government interest in the all-male law, as re-
quired by an intermediate scrutiny gender discrimination analysis.24 
In doing so, the district court plainly rejected a deferential treatment 
of Congress’s contrary factual findings.   
 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the district court’s approach 
and noted that particular deference was due to the determinations of 
Congress in the area of military affairs.25 Relying heavily on the leg-
islative reports, the Court concluded that Congress reasonably and 
constitutionally excluded women from draft registration plans. Ex-
plaining the correct standard of review to apply to the case, the Court 
stated that Congress’s determination in regard to the single-sex draft 
registration decision deserved dual layers of deference—in addition 
to the deference normally accorded congressional determinations, 
issues concerning national defense and military affairs deserved the 
highest level of deference from the Court.26 Tracing Congress’s pow-
ers to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution—including the authori-
ty to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and 
make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces27—
the Court categorized such powers as “broad and sweeping.”28  
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the judiciary itself largely 
lacked competence in the area of military affairs.29 
                                                                                                                                       
into the armed forces, Congress simultaneously passed legislation to exclude them from 
conscripted service. Id. Following the district court decision, the Director of the Selective 
Service, Bernard Rostker, filed a notice of appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Justice Brennan, acting as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, stayed the order. See  
Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1311 (1980). Soon after, the Supreme Court noted 
probable jurisdiction. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980).   
 24. Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at 605 (citing the “important interest” standard from Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). In Craig, the challenged state law prohibited men aged 18-
20, but not women, from purchasing low-alcohol beer. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92. The Court, 
applying intermediate scrutiny, determined that the law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 208-09. Although the state showed an im-
portant interest in lowering alcohol-related traffic incidents, that purpose was not sufficiently 
related to the discriminatory law, despite an arguable numeric correlation showing a greater 
likelihood of men being involved in traffic incidents. Id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring).   
 25. In describing the framework of deference to Congress’s findings, and the resulting 
rejection of the district court’s analysis, Justice Rehnquist stated, “[W]e must be particular-
ly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our 
own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.” Rostker 
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981). 
 26. Id. at 64-65 (“The case arises in the context of Congress’s authority over national 
defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress 
greater deference.”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.   
 28. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).   
 29. Id. at 65-66 (“[It] is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in 
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as 
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially pro-
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 The Court’s reasoning in upholding the law was ultimately rooted 
in the long-standing prohibition against women serving in combat 
roles. Congressional testimony established that in a draft-time sce-
nario, the military’s greatest personnel need would be combat 
troops.30 Noting the statutory restrictions and executive policy pre-
venting women from filling such roles, Justice Rehnquist, therefore 
concluded that women and men were not similarly situated for pur-
poses of a draft or draft registration.31 For this reason, Congress’s 
registration plans were sufficiently related to the stated purpose in 
authorizing registration.32 Under this line of reasoning, an analysis of 
the underlying policy of excluding women generally from combat was 
unnecessary. The policy of excluding women from combat roles thus 
became a proxy for the Court and allowed it to avoid examining the 
MSSA on the fundamental basis of gender exclusion.   
 There were significant differences in how the Supreme Court and 
the district court evaluated the legislative findings. In overturning 
the MSSA as unconstitutional, the district court was persuaded by 
military testimony before Congress which revealed that in an antici-
pated draft of 650,000 personnel, the military could absorb 80,000 
females to fill noncombat roles.33 Conversely, the Supreme Court not-
ed that even assuming women could be drafted to fill some noncom-
bat roles, Congress had found that including women in registration 
and the draft was not “worth the added burdens.”34 Citing congres-
sional findings that military training would be unnecessarily ham-
pered, the Court also did not find merit in the proposition that all 
women could be registered, but only a small percentage actually in-
ducted in a draft.35 Moreover, the Court noted that Congress had es-
timated that female volunteers would fill the available slots in a 
                                                                                                                                       
fessional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Exec-
utive Branches.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 
(1973))). The Court went on to quote Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953):  
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army . . . [t]he military consti-
tutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of 
the civilian.  Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous 
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous 
not to intervene in judicial matters.  
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 71.   
 30. Id. at 76 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 160 (1980)).     
 31. Id. at 78.   
 32. Id. at 79.   
 33. Id. at 80-81.   
 34. Id. at 81.   
 35. Id. The Court also cited the Senate Committee Report which acknowledged other 
administrative problems, including difficulties related to housing, treatment of dependents, 
and differences in physical standards. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 159).   
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draft-time scenario.36 Perhaps most important for the Court, howev-
er, was Congress’s stated goal of military flexibility during wartime. 
According to congressional findings, military units and personnel 
must be available to fill both combat and noncombat roles, depending 
on mission requirements.37 This fact would ostensibly make filling 
those 80,000 noncombat roles with primarily women infeasible. As to 
the argument that most military officials actually supported includ-
ing women in the draft, the Court stated that Congress’s findings 
showed that those officials who voiced support for including women 
in registration did so out of “equity” concerns, rather than military 
needs.38 In conclusion, the Court found that the district court had 
erred in “undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence, 
rather than adopting an appropriately deferential examination of 
Congress’ evaluation of that evidence.”39 
 In his dissent, Justice Marshall took issue with the majority’s in-
terpretation of congressional testimony. Justice Marshall noted that 
contrary to Congress’s eventual exclusion of women from the MSSA, 
the Department of Defense and all four military service chiefs had 
unanimously advocated requiring women to register for the Selective 
Service.40 He understood the congressional testimony regarding the 
potential 80,000 female inductees that could be absorbed into the 
military as having already accounted for the issue of military flexibil-
ity.41 In other words, women could fill those positions without nega-
tively affecting military flexibility. Two other dissenting Justices, Jus-
tices White and Brennan, also agreed with this understanding of the 
testimony.42 Substantial numbers of women could be utilized in a draft, 
then, and there was an inadequate governmental basis for excluding 
them. Ultimately for the dissenters, some women could fill some roles, 
and that was a sufficient basis to include them in draft registration. 
B.   Criticism of Rostker 
 The Rostker decision, while enjoying popular support at the time, 
has faced strong criticism from legal scholars.43 Particularly troubling 
                                                                                                                       
 36. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 158 (1980)).   
 37. Id. at 81-82 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 158 (1980)). 
 38. Id. at 80 (first citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 158 (1980); and then 126 CONG. REC. 
13,893 (1980) (statement of Sen. Nunn)).   
 39. Id. at 83 (emphasis omitted). 
 40. Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 41. Id. at 100.   
 42. See id. at 83-113 (White, J., dissenting).    
 43. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudi-
cial Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 126 (2008) (stating that extrajudicial de-
bate about women’s role in society and the military significantly influenced Justice 
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was the Court’s overly deferential acceptance of Congress’s findings.44 
For example, after examining the legislative testimony, the three dis-
senting Justices explicitly disagreed with Congress’s interpretation of 
military flexibility vis-à-vis the 80,000 slots that could have been 
filled by women.45 Not only was the record of the flexibility justifica-
tion doubtful, but even viewed in Congress’s favor, exact details were 
quite unclear.46 Although testimony did support the idea that service 
members serving in support roles would sometimes have to use basic 
combat skills, no clarification was made regarding the actual frequen-
cy of that occurrence or how often it would likely occur in the future.47 
 Perhaps most problematic was the Rostker Court’s unbridled ac-
ceptance of factual determinations made by Congress that were at 
odds with military testimony. As emphasized in both dissents, the 
Department of Defense itself and all four armed service chiefs had 
recommended including women in the Selective Service.48 Moreover, 
Congress’s portrayal of military testimony in support of women’s in-
clusion in the MSSA as based on “equity” concerns, rather than needs 
of the military, was potentially misleading. The term “equity,” as 
Congress used it and the majority later adopted, implied that by ad-
vocating women’s inclusion in Selective Service registration, the  
Pentagon was merely bowing to political correctness.49 Instead,  
the term was used by military officials during testimony to contrast 
                                                                                                                                       
Rehnquist’s majority opinion); Wildman, supra note 6, at 293-94 (arguing that the Court 
played a role in normalizing gender inequality by using Congress’s discriminatory findings 
to justify its holding).   
 44. See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in 
the Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 182 n.81 (1990) (arguing that 
in Rostker, the Court utilized a highly deferential review which only paid “lipservice” to the 
established standard of scrutiny for gender-based classifications); see also William A.  
Kamens, Comment, Selective Disservice: The Indefensible Discrimination of Draft Registra-
tion, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (2003) (arguing that the Court did not use the accepted 
gender-based classification scrutiny level for the case and actually shifted the burden of 
proof to the plaintiff). See generally Ellen Oberwetter, Note, Rethinking Military Deference: 
Male-Only Draft Registration and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian Rights, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 173 (1999).   
 45. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 84 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 46. See id. at 79-80 (majority opinion). 
 47. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1981: Hearing on S. 2294 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 96th Cong. 1390 (1980) 
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 2294] (statement of Lieutenant General Robert Yerks, Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Personnel) (testifying that past conflicts have necessitated military sup-
port personnel becoming involved in combat and that trend generally increased during 
Vietnam). No clarifying questions were asked regarding projections for the actual number 
of support troops who would face this risk in the future.    
 48. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83-84 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 49. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2294, supra note 47, at 1856 (statement of Richard Danzig, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).   
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absolute military requirements.50 In other words, according to Penta-
gon officials, there were sufficient numbers of men to fill the ranks of 
the military in the event of a draft. Therefore, women, while they 
were valued members of the armed services and could certainly be 
useful in many military roles, were technically not “necessary.” It 
was due to “equity,” as opposed to absolute necessity, that the offi-
cials recommended women be included in the draft. Further, as Jus-
tice White noted in his dissent, there was a dearth of evidence on the 
record to show that sufficient females would volunteer for military 
service, thereby filling available “female” slots—a contention made by 
Congress and also adopted by the majority.51   
                                                                                                                       
 50. See, e.g., id. In one heated exchange, Senator Roger Jepsen repeatedly questioned 
an Office of the Secretary of Defense official on whether it was essential that females be  
registered: 
 Senator Jepsen. I cannot get a yes or no answer. Either we have a military 
need or we don’t. That is what we are talking about when we talk about regis-
tration and draft, military need to protect the national security of this country 
which we are mandated to provide in this country.   
 So, if there is a military need for registering women, we should do it.  If 
there is no military need for registering women—and you talk about social ac-
ceptance and a few other things in this country that for 204 years has made us 
the country that we are—this won’t look good for the record—but, I fail to un-
derstand at all where you’re coming from.   
 I admit I am not at all objective nor am I about to be or will I ever be on 
registering women. If you did not draft women, would you be unable to meet 
the Department of Defense requirements with men?   
 Mr. Danzing. If we did not draft women, we could meet the Department of 
Defense requirements with men.  
 Senator Jepsen. So, is there a military need to register women?  
 Mr. Danzig. Senator, let me suggest I think we can agree on the proposition 
that security of the Republic does not rest on our capacity to draft women. If we 
did not draft women, military needs could be met exclusively with men. If the 
question is can women do things that are useful for military purposes, the an-
swer is clearly yes. I think that we would both agree with that.   
 Senator Jepsen. Are you associating your advocacy of registering women 
with the military need?  
 Mr. Danzig. I think that the case for registering women does not stem from a 
need to have numbers of people to man the military forces of the United States.   
 Senator Jepsen. So, your advocacy for registering women has more to do 
with equity in response to pushy groups at this time? 
Id.   
 51. In fact, this conclusion is highly doubtful based on other testimony before Con-
gress. During the 1981 appropriations bill testimony, Chairman Stennis asked General 
Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army, if there had been any problems in recruiting 
women. General Rogers admitted the Army fell short of its female recruitment goals. See 
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearing on 
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 According to the precedent set in Craig v. Boren,52 the Court 
should have used an intermediate scrutiny analysis for a gender dis-
crimination claim.53 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government 
must generally show that it has an important interest in the regula-
tion and that the law at issue bears a substantial relationship to that 
interest.54 Here, then, the government should have shouldered the 
burden in showing that the exclusion of females from draft registra-
tion served an important interest and that the interest—in raising 
and supporting military forces, maintaining readiness, preserving 
national security, or other justification—was substantially related to 
excluding women from registration. As the dissenters insinuated, 
this would have been a highly difficult task.55 Parsing numbers aside, 
the number of military roles that could have been filled by women in 
a draft scenario was certainly not zero (or even close to zero). There-
fore, registering and conscripting women would have in fact helped 
further the government’s interest even if women could not have been 
utilized at the same rate of male draftees. The only justification to 
exclude women from registration would have been “administrative 
convenience,” an inadequate justification in precedent military  
cases.56  
                                                                                                                                       
S. 428 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 96th Cong. 663 (1979) (statement of General 
Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army). 
 52. 429 U.S. 190, 208-09, 218 (1976).    
 53. See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530, 532-34 (1996) (holding that 
the all-male Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to 
admit female applicants). In that case, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated 
that the state must evince an “exceedingly persuasive justification” in a gender-based dis-
crimination claim, ostensibly raising the bar for the government to successfully defend a 
challenge based under equal protection.  Id. at 524.   
 54. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.   
 55. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83-85 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 
90-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 56. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (holding that “adminis-
trative convenience” was not adequate justification for the military to require female, but 
not male, service members to prove spousal dependency before being eligible for military 
dependent benefits). Furthermore, as the Selective Service system is a separate entity from 
the Department of Defense, the administrative burden of registering women, even if a cer-
tain proportion would not eventually be conscripted, would fall on the independently  
funded agency, not the military. See About the Agency, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., 
https://www.sss.gov/About [https://perma.cc/37CL-G4X2] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). Other 
concerns cited by Congress during its hearings, including additional resources being neces-
sary to build facilities—most likely barracks and bathrooms—for female recruits, should 
also be considered under this “administrative convenience” category. See Rostker, 453 U.S. 
at 81. In Rostker, the majority also accepted Congress’s finding that military training 
would be burdened by processing and training women who could not be used in the war 
effort. Id. This risk, if it did hold any merit, seems to be mitigated by the military’s new 
Occupational Physical Assessment Test initiative, which is designed to adequately screen 
all potential personnel for physical qualifications related to their anticipated military spe-
cialty. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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 Instead, however, the Court seemed to avoid this analysis entirely 
by deeming men and women “not similarly situated” because of the 
combat exclusion policy.57 Unfortunately, the Court failed to articu-
late exactly how it applied intermediate scrutiny in conjunction with 
military deference. In fact, the Court’s highly deferential treatment 
convinced some lower federal courts that the established intermedi-
ate scrutiny standard of review did not apply in military sex-
discrimination cases.58   
C.   Rostker and the Elimination of the Combat Exclusion 
 The Court has never readdressed the male-only draft registration 
question. Changes in Pentagon policy since that time, however, have 
significantly changed the landscape of gender roles in the military. In 
2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the elimi-
nation of the military’s combat restrictions for females.59 The military 
branches fully implemented the policy by January 2016, opening  
approximately 220,000 jobs to female service members.60 Many have 
argued that the Pentagon’s recent policy change to allow women into 
combat positions has fatally undermined the analysis and holding in 
Rostker.61 Given a healthy dose of deference by the Court, however, it 
is not difficult to fathom how the government could attempt to justify 
                                                                                                                       
 57. Justice Rehnquist cited Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), as justifica-
tion for this categorization. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67. In Schlesinger, the Court considered a 
due process challenge to a naval policy that allowed female officers more time than male 
officers to gain promotion to the next highest rank, a necessary step in remaining in active 
service. Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 501-05. The Schlesinger Court held the policy to be consti-
tutional because males and females were not similarly situated in naval service. The Court 
reasoned that the “different treatment of men and women naval officers . . . reflects not 
archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and 
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for 
professional service.” Id. at 508. Because women were not eligible for combat or sea duty, 
the policy was simply a reflection of the reality that female officers took longer to move up 
the military ranks. See id. at 510 n.13.   
 58. As a result, these courts diverged from the scrutiny standard established by Craig 
and appeared to use a markedly lower standard for gender inequality claims in military 
cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. U.S. Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Based on 
my reading of Rostker . . . I conclude that the standard outlined in Craig is not applicable 
to gender-based equal protection claims raised in the context of military affairs . . . .”); Rog-
ers, supra note 44, at 182 n.81.   
 59. Dempsey Memorandum, supra note 7. 
 60. Matthew Rosenberg & Dave Phillips, All Combat Roles Now Open to Women, De-
fense Secretary Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/ 
politics/combat-military-women-ash-carter.html?_r=0Dec. 3, 2015.   
 61. See, e.g., Russell Spivak & Adam Aliano, G.I. Jane and the Selective Service: Equal 
Protection Challenges to Male-Only Selective Service in the Modern Military, HARV. J. 
LEGIS. ONLINE NOTES (Aug. 5, 2016), http://harvardjol.com/2016/08/05/gi-jane-and-the-
selective-service-equal-protection-challenges-to-male-only-selective-service-in-the-modern-
military/ [https://perma.cc/WU4D-CKZ7].   
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the law’s continued constitutionality. In an argument to uphold the 
MSSA, the government could submit that although almost all mili-
tary positions are now available to women, they do not meet the 
physical requirements of combat positions in high proportions.62 
Therefore, following the reasoning in Rostker, women are not “simi-
larly situated” with men because they would not be able to effectively 
perform in combat positions that would become necessary to fill in a 
draft-time scenario.63   
 As a threshold matter, if not for the precedent of Rostker, this 
would be a difficult argument to sustain. Many senior military offi-
cials have recently given support to the inclusion of women in draft 
registration plans. In a February 2016 Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee hearing, two of the armed forces service chiefs agreed that 
women should be included in Selective Service registration.64 There 
                                                                                                                       
 62. As the military has only recently allowed women to fill roles within the combat 
arms, no widespread data is currently available showing the attrition rate for females in 
combat arms training. The U.S Army has recently started a program to physically screen 
soldiers and officers before they enter training for their occupation-specific branch. The 
Occupational Physical Assessment Test (OPAT) is a gender-neutral assessment tool de-
signed to ensure soldiers meet the minimum physical requirements for their anticipated 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The physical standards were developed by testing 
the capabilities of currently serving service members within those MOS categories. Cur-
rently in its diagnostic phase, the OPAT is anticipated to be an Army-wide accessions re-
quirement by summer 2017. Interview with Major Dan Hayden, Dir. of Military Acces-
sions, U.S. Military Acad., in West Point, N.Y. (Dec. 13, 2016). The ability of women to 
successfully meet OPAT requirements among combat specialties would certainly be influ-
ential to future litigation.  
 63. Another possible basis of objection to including women in registration is the une-
qual rate at which women have sustained injuries in ground combat training, particularly 
due to load bearing. See Memorandum from Ash Carter, Sec’y of Def. & Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Implementation Guidance for the Full Integration of Women in  
the Armed Services (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ 
OSD014303-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC2L-7TAN]. Finally, Defense Secretary Ash Carter also 
acknowledged the potential issues with female service members operating in cultural envi-
ronments with allies and partners who are “culturally opposed to working with women.” Id. 
 64. The Implementation of the Decision to Open All Ground Combat Units to Women: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 114th Cong. 63-64 (2016) (statements of 
General Robert Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Ray Mabus, Secretary of the 
Navy; Patrick Murphy, Under Secretary of the Army; and General Mark Milley, Chief of 
Staff of the Army). Interestingly, the civilian military leadership in attendance was less 
supportive of the measure. Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, and acting Secretary of the 
Army, Patrick Murphy, stated that there should be public debate on the issue. The rele-
vant testimony included, in part: 
 Senator McCaskill. . . .  
 I think one of the questions we have to address now is registering for the se-
lective service. As some of you may know, there was a Supreme Court decision 
back in 1981 when in fact the question was put in front of the Supreme Court 
whether women should be required to register for the Selective Service under 
current law. Justice Rehnquist wrote, “the existence of combat restrictions clearly 
indicates the basis for Congress’s decision to exempt women from registration. 
The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since 
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was no mention of the government’s important interest in “flexibil-
ity.” Moreover, support roles in the armed services greatly outnum-
ber combat roles.65 Such support roles are in medical, logistics, engi-
neering, aviation, intelligence, transportation, finance, and other 
specialties.66 Women have been serving in these roles for years, effec-
tively and with distinction. In fact, women now make up approxi-
                                                                                                                                       
women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded they would not be needed 
in the event of a draft and therefore decided not to register them.” So in other 
words, the rationale that Rehnquist used for saying there was no requirement of 
women to register for the Selective Service has now been eliminated.  
 And I guess I want to ask all of you your sense of this. . . . And if you would 
briefly go down the line and give me your sense as to whether or not Congress 
should look at requiring selective service registration for all Americans.  
 General Neller. Senator, it is my personal view that based on this lifting of 
restrictions for assignment to unit MOS, that every American who is physically 
qualified should register for the draft.  
 Senator McCaskill. Secretary Mabus?  
 Mr. Mabus. Senator, I think you correctly pointed out this needs to be 
looked at as part of a national debate, given the changed circumstances.  
 The one thing you did say, not selective service-related, but that we do be-
lieve that this will open up recruiting, that more women will be interested in—I 
will just talk about the Marines—in the Marines because these last restrictions 
have been removed.  
 Senator McCaskill. Secretary Murphy?  
 Mr. Murphy. Senator, I believe that, yes, there should be a national debate 
and I encourage the legislative body to look at that. I would say that unlike the 
decision in 1981 where we are now in the longest war in American history over 
the last almost 15 years, that we have had over 1,000 women killed or injured 
in combat. Now, with this implementation, if you can meet the standard, you 
are on a team no matter what MOS it is. So I highly encourage that national 
debate, ma’am.  
 . . . . 
 Senator McCaskill. General Milley?  
 General Milley. Senator, I think that all eligible and qualified men and 
women should register for the draft.  
 Senator McCaskill. Well, I do too. I think it is the right thing going forward. 
Id. Secretary of the Air Force, Deborah Lee James, has also publicly voiced support for includ-
ing women in draft plans. Richard Lardner, Air Force Secretary Supports Draft Registration for 
Women, MILITARY.COM (June 4, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/06/04/air-force-
secretary-supports-draft-registration-women.html [https://perma.cc/6YCV-E5UP]. 
 65. Among enlisted Army personnel, for instance, support troops outnumber combat 
troops over 3:1. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Military 
Careers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/military/military-careers.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X6Z3-LVFH] (last updated Oct. 24, 2017).   
 66. See id. 
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mately fifteen percent of the current active duty force.67 It is clear 
that women, if included in draft registration plans, would perform 
necessary and important functions in future conflicts if conscription 
was necessary, adding to the overall effectiveness of military opera-
tions. Undeniably, there is no important interest gained by not in-
cluding them, especially with low-cost physical screening measures in 
place for filling combat roles.68 As seen in Rostker, however, the views 
of Congress and arguments put forth by government counsel have 
sometimes outweighed even the expert opinions of Pentagon officials. 
Even with the lifting of the combat exclusion rule, any future legal 
challenge to the MSSA will hinge on the Court’s use of deference.   
III.   MILITARY DEFERENCE 
 Undoubtedly, judicial deference to Congress’s findings played a 
significant role in the Court’s holding in Rostker. Deference in mili-
tary matters, in fact, occupies a noteworthy position in many historic 
Supreme Court decisions concerning both military and national secu-
rity issues. In an early case, Martin v. Mott,69 the Court considered a 
challenge by a New York citizen who was conscripted for service in 
the militia. The President authorized the conscription under a 1795 
law which gave the Executive the power to call forth the militia 
“whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent 
danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe.”70  
Congress passed the statute under its constitutional power to call 
forth the militia in times of national need.71 After failing to obey his 
conscription order, Mott was tried by court-martial.72 Mott later chal-
lenged his conviction on several grounds, most notably that the  
President lacked authority under the statute to call forth the militia 
                                                                                                                       
 67. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF., 2014 DEMOGRAPHICS: PRO-
FILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY 18 (2014), http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/ 
MOS/Reports/2014-Demographics-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4938-45CW]. In 2014, there 
were approximately 200,000 females on active duty in the various armed service branches, 
out of a total of 1.3 million active duty personnel. The gender make-up varied substantially 
between services, however. For example, women comprised almost 19% of the Air Force, 
but less than 0.8% of the Marine Corps that year. Id. at 19-20.   
 68. See supra note 62. The argument to include women is especially persuasive consider-
ing approximately 75% of young Americans are ineligible to join the military because of obesi-
ty, lack of high school education, felony convictions, medical conditions, and appearance is-
sues. See Miriam Jordan, Recruits’ Ineligibility Tests the Military, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/recruits-ineligibility-tests-the-military-1403909945. 
 69. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). 
 70. Id. at 28-29.  
 71. “To provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress 
insurrections, and repel invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 72. Martin, 25 U.S. at 28. 
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at that time because there was no imminent danger of invasion.73 The 
Supreme Court rejected Mott’s contention under two main justifica-
tions. First was a consideration of the role of the judiciary in such a 
case. Justice Story, writing for the unanimous Court, stated that mil-
itary service carried the unique requirements of immediate obedience 
to the decisions of the chain of command.74 Judicial interference with 
these judgments, according to Story, would be dangerous and “sub-
versive of all discipline.”75   
 The Court went on to state a second justification for rebuffing 
Mott’s position. Judicial review was unwarranted in the case because 
of separation of powers considerations and the fact that the Execu-
tive possessed unique expertise in the area of national security: 
[I]n many instances, the evidence upon which the President might 
decide that there is imminent danger of invasion, might be of a na-
ture not constituting strict technical proof, or the disclosure of the 
evidence might reveal important secrets of state, which the public 
interest, and even safety, might imperiously demand to be kept in 
concealment.  
The power itself is confided to the Executive of the Union, to him 
who is, by the constitution, “the commander in chief of the militia, 
when called into the actual service of the United States,” whose duty 
it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and whose 
responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is se-
cured by the highest sanctions. He is necessarily constituted the 
judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is 
bound to act according to his belief of the facts.76  
                                                                                                                       
 73. Id. at 24.   
 74. Id. at 30.   
 75. Justice Story went on to state that: 
A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the complete 
attainment of the object. The service is a military service, and the command of 
a military nature; and in such cases, every delay, and every obstacle to an effi-
cient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard the public inter-
ests. While subordinate officers or soldiers are pausing to consider whether 
they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the evidence of the facts upon 
which the commander in chief exercises the right to demand their services, the 
hostile enterprise may be accomplished without the means of resistance. . . . If 
a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the President upon his 
own doubts as to the exigency having arisen, it must be equally the right of 
every inferior officer and soldier; and any act done by any person in furtherance 
of such orders would subject him to responsibility in a civil suit, in which his 
defense must finally rest upon his ability to establish the facts by competent 
proofs. Such a course would be subversive of all discipline, and expose the best 
disposed officers to the chances of ruinous litigation.  
Id. at 30-31. 
 76. Id. at 31.  
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In other words, the President’s constitutional role vested him with 
broad discretion to act in the interests of national security, and the 
Court was not privy to the information necessary to second-guess the 
Executive’s judgment in this area.   
 Looking at the relevant historical case law, beginning with Martin 
and stretching into modern day, military deference comes in a variety 
of “flavors.”77 In general, the Court’s use of military deference primar-
ily occurs in two, sometimes overlapping, ways.78 First is a commit-
ment by the Court to abide by the constitutional prescription of sepa-
ration of powers, and an acknowledgement that the judiciary is the 
branch with the least expertise in national security and war-related 
issues. In these cases, the Court generally relies on the war power 
provisions of the Constitution. Under Article I, Section 8, Congress 
has the authority to declare war, fund and maintain the armed forc-
es, and make rules governing the armed forces.79 And under Article 
II, Section 2, the President is Commander in Chief of the armed  
forces.80 Historically, this type of deference has been influential in 
convincing the Court to abstain from reaching the merits of certain 
cases as being outside the scope of proper judicial review.81 In other 
                                                                                                                       
 77. The usual deference granted by courts to executive statutory interpretation is not 
considered under the umbrella of military deference in this Article. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (outlining the test for when rea-
sonable executive agency interpretations of statutes should be granted broad deference by 
courts); see also Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and 
Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 444-46 (2005) (arguing that administrative def-
erence analysis under Chevron should be followed by courts when granting deference to 
factual military determinations). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, 
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations 
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1086-87 (2008); Julian Ku & John Yoo, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive 
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 194-96 (2006) (discussing the role that Chevron-type 
deference has played in modern national security cases). 
 78. But see, e.g., Barney F. Biello, Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers’ Rights: Is the 
Principle of Deference A Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465, 474-77 (1989) (de-
lineating a total of four distinct bases of military deference).    
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.   
 80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.   
 81. Justice Story’s opinion in Martin is a good example. See also, e.g., Dynes v. Hoo-
ver, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82-83 (1857). In Dynes, a Navy seaman filed suit on the basis 
that he had been tried for a crime for which he had not been charged. Id. Refusing to reach 
the merits of his case, the Dynes Court reiterated Congress’s military-related powers and 
held that as long as a court-martial was properly convened and had jurisdiction over the 
defendant, civil courts had no role in substantive review. Id. But see Reid v. Covert,  354 
U.S. 1, 63-64 (1957) (holding that despite international treaties in effect to the contrary, 
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to subject civilians accompanying the armed 
forces overseas to the Uniform Code of Military Justice during peace-time, and therefore, 
infringing on their Fifth and Sixth Amendments rights); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866) (holding that the executive branch lacked the authority to try a 
citizen accused of assisting the Confederacy in a military tribunal when regular courts 
were in operation).   
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cases, this justification failed to persuade the Court to abstain  
completely but nonetheless played an important role in its level of 
review or in its balancing of interests.82   
 The “separation of powers” deference argument has been influen-
tial in multiple cases involving the military’s infringement on civil 
liberties. Perhaps the most maligned case in this line is the World 
War II-era decision Korematsu v. United States,83 in which the  
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the military’s geo-
graphical exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry on the West 
Coast.84 The Court purportedly balanced the interests of national  
security and the due process rights of Japanese Americans, many of 
whom were citizens. Ultimately persuasive for the Court were argu-
ments from the military espousing the dangers of disloyal Japanese 
Americans, grounded in the fact that when given the opportunity to 
renounce allegiance to Japan subsequent to the exclusion, 5,000 Jap-
anese Americans declined to do so.85 Although the Korematsu Court 
announced a strict scrutiny standard of review,86 the Court’s holding 
displayed a readiness to ascribe overwhelming weight to the govern-
ment’s national security arguments, despite a lack of reasonable 
proof of actual exigency or concrete risk. As discussed below, the  
deference derived from separation of powers concerns is frequently 
used in the context of national security and has been pertinent in the 
Court’s GWOT cases.  
                                                                                                                       
 82. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1968) (holding that a 
federal law criminalizing the burning of draft cards was constitutional as an incidental 
content-neutral restriction on speech, as the government had a substantial interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the Selective Service system).   
 83. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 84. In Korematsu, Japanese persons who refused to obey the exclusion order, like Mr. 
Korematsu, or who did not have the luxury of moving elsewhere, were detained in military 
detention centers. Id. at 215-17. The Court limited its review to the exclusion order itself 
and declined to rule on the constitutionality of the detention centers. See id. at 221-24. See 
also Hirabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1942) (upholding a conviction for vio-
lating a military curfew order on Japanese Americans). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 
283, 302, 304 (1944) (holding the U.S. government could not indefinitely detain a citizen 
whom it did not suspect of subversion on the same day Korematsu was decided). 
 85. According to the military, it was impossible to segregate the disloyal Japanese Ameri-
can from the loyal in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, so necessity dictated total ex-
clusion from strategically vulnerable West Coast areas. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.   
 86. The Court stated: 
 It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to 
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must 
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can. 
Id. at 216.   
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 The second main justification for deference is the recognition that 
the military, as a unique war-fighting institution, has specific needs 
for its own operation.87 In Mott, for example, the Court emphasized 
the need for unquestioned obedience on the part of soldiers, necessi-
tating a limited role for the civilian judiciary in interfering with a 
commander’s decision.88 As discussed above, the Rostker Court largely 
justified its deference on this basis.89 This “military needs” or  
“military necessity” deference justification is common in cases involv-
ing service member’s rights and has become more influential to the 
Court in fairly recent times.90 The military necessity justification 
most frequently plays a role in interests-balancing analyses, allowing 
the government to regulate behavior that would be unconstitutional 
in the purely civilian context. In Goldman v. Weinberger,91 for in-
stance, the Court upheld a military regulation prohibiting Jewish 
service members from wearing a yarmulke in uniform, against a 
First Amendment challenge.92 Likewise, in Parker v. Levy,93 the 
Court upheld an Army officer’s criminal conviction for using lan-
guage critical of the Vietnam war.94 In both cases, the Court recog-
nized the unique nature of the military; specifically, the need for uni-
formity and obedience, and the importance of mission accomplish-
ment. These same justifications can also be seen in civilian cases, 
although less frequently and with seemingly less potency. For exam-
ple, in Greer v. Spock,95 the Court upheld a military commander’s 
                                                                                                                       
 87. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“The complex, subtle, and pro-
fessional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force 
are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the 
Legislative and Executive Branches.”). 
 88. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 19, 30 (1827). 
 89. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text. 
 90. See John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doc-
trine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161, 261-62 (2000) (tracing the history of judicial deference and find-
ing this type’s most robust usage by the Burger Court). 
 91. 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986).   
 92. Id. at 507 (“The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the ex-
tent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accom-
plish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and 
esprit de corps.”).   
 93. 417 U.S. 733, 761 (1974).   
 94. The Court stated: 
 While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection 
granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military com-
munity and of the military mission requires a different application of those pro-
tections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessi-
ty for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that 
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.  
Id. at 758.   
 95. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
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right to forbid civilian political speeches and distribution of campaign 
literature on a military installation.96 The Court held for the military, 
stating that because allowing political speech on post would be a  
detriment to military training, no constitutional violation had  
occurred.97  
 To complicate matters, the above doctrinal flavors of deference 
may be further parsed into the manner in which the Court applies 
such deference. As discussed above, military and national security-
specific arguments variously convinced the Court to abstain from de-
ciding the central merits of a case, played a decisive role in interest-
balancing, and heavily swayed its conclusion when applying a given 
standard of review.98 Another way in which deference colors military 
cases, usually concurrently with the ways above, is through military 
fact deference. Usually based in the Court’s acknowledgement that 
Congress, the President, or the military itself possesses unique 
knowledge or expertise in certain matters, the Court refrains from 
judging the veracity, importance, or immanence of facts submitted by 
the government.99 This manner of deference was evident in the  
majority opinion of Rostker, as Justice Rehnquist accepted Congress’s 
finding that the need for “military flexibility” justified the total ex-
clusion of women from draft registration plans. Fact deference was 
also dispositive in Korematsu, as the majority opinion accepted the 
fact that 5,000 Japanese Americans had refused to renounce loyalty 
to Japan as evidence that they played a serious threat to national 
security, justifying their wholesale exclusion from the West Coast.100 
The Court gave great deference not just to a quantifiable fact  
proffered by the government, but also to the nexus between that fact, 
the risk to national security, and subsequent need for military defer-
ence.101 As discussed below, relative deference given by the Court to 
                                                                                                                       
 96. Id. at 839-40. 
 97. Id. at 839 (noting that the installation had not discriminated based on the content 
of the anticipated speech—no political speech had ever been allowed on the installation). 
But see United States v. Flowers, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972) (holding that the military could 
not prohibit First Amendment activity in an area of post that had been “abandoned” to 
public use).   
 98. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text. 
 99. For a historical study of fact deference, see generally Steven B. Lichtman, The 
Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tradition of 
Deference to the Military, 1918-2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907, 915 (2006).  
 100. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944). The majority came 
to this conclusion despite wording from the same military report that referred to Japanese 
persons as belonging “to ‘an enemy race’ ” whose “racial strains are undiluted,” plainly 
indicating racial bias. Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting).   
 101. See Masur, supra note 77, at 454-57 (noting that the Korematsu Court failed to 
meaningfully inquire into the military report and essentially abdicated its judicial role to 
the “expertise” of the military).   
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factual determinations by the military regarding the status and crim-
inal liability of GWOT detainees was the cornerstone of those  
cases.102   
 Judicial deference in military matters has been decisive in numer-
ous historic cases, many times to the detriment of the preservation of 
civil liberties. Partly as a result, the military deference doctrine itself 
has been heavily criticized as being contrary to founding American 
principles.103 Despite its consistent use of military deference, and its 
dispositive effect in many controversies, the Court has never an-
nounced a test or set definitive guiding principles to be used in mili-
tary deference cases. Indeed, the lack of guidance on this matter has 
led to varying approaches by lower courts.104 Legal scholars and  
practitioners have expressed frustration over the lack of Supreme 
Court guidance on the military deference doctrine, calling for a more 
authoritative standard of review in such cases.105 
IV.   THE SUPREME COURT’S MODERN APPROACH  
TO MILITARY DEFERENCE 
 In anticipating the nature of deferential treatment most likely to 
be accorded in a modern constitutional challenge to the MSSA, it is 
instructive to outline a framework of the Court’s modern approach to 
deference cases. What follows is a brief examination of recent  
Supreme Court cases related to military matters. All cases involve 
controversies that pit national security or military-centric concerns 
against the individual rights of civilians. Cases involving military 
issues where the Court made a narrow ruling—when its decision was 
based purely on statutory interpretation, for example—have been 
omitted.106 Although the Court has continued to refrain from setting 
                                                                                                                       
 102. For a full exploration of the principles behind national security fact deference, see 
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1392-93, 1395-
98 (2009). 
 103. See, e.g., Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case 
Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1992); Stephanie A. 
Levin, The Deference That is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the 
Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1990); Karen A. Ruzic, Note, Military Justice and the 
Supreme Court’s Outdated Standard of Deference: Weiss v. United States, 70 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 265, 266 (1994). 
 104. See also Chesney, supra note 102, at 1434 (categorizing the approach to national 
security fact deference, and understanding of its theoretical underpinnings, among courts 
as inconsistent and troubling). See generally Gabriel W. Gorenstein, Note, Judicial Review 
of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 389, 397-98, 400, 
402-403 (1984).  
 105. See, e.g., Biello, supra note 78, at 481-82.   
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1153 (2014). In Apel, the respond-
ent was barred from Air Force property because of misconduct, but violated the order by 
demonstrating in the base’s protest area, at one point throwing blood on a sign for the in-
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guidelines for its reliance on military deference, some general princi-
ples and trends may be gleaned from this recent case law.   
A.   Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) 
 In an early GWOT case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,107 an American citi-
zen detained in Afghanistan by U.S. forces challenged his domestic 
detention as an enemy combatant.108 Hamdi challenged his confine-
ment on several grounds, including that the government had violated 
his Fifth Amendment due process rights because he faced indefinite 
detention without trial or access to counsel.109 In a four-person plural-
ity opinion by Justice O’Connor,110 partially supported by two other 
justices, the Court held that although the government did generally 
have the power to detain a combatant for the duration of hostilities in 
a conflict without criminal trial, the Fifth Amendment guaranteed an 
American citizen the right to challenge the military’s combatant de-
tention determination in front of a neutral decisionmaker.111 As envi-
sioned by the plurality opinion, this review process could accommo-
date national security and war-fighting concerns put forth by the 
government; namely, by allowing hearsay evidence and having a pre-
sumption favoring the military’s initial determination.112 Such a 
compromise, in the eyes of the Court, would ensure the appropriate 
balance of military concerns with the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
the detainee’s liberty.113   
 The Court’s consensus was a far cry from the government’s advo-
cated position, however. Justice O’Connor first rejected the govern-
                                                                                                                                       
stallation. Id. at 1148. He was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 for reentering a military 
area after having been ordered not to do so by a military commander. Id. at 1149. At issue 
before the Court was whether the protest area, being a part of military property but at the 
site of an easement, fell under the auspices of the statute. Id. at 1150. The Court concluded 
that it did and upheld Apel’s conviction. Id. at 1153. Because the lower court had not ruled 
on the constitutionality of whether the statute itself or as applied violated the First 
Amendment, the Court reserved the constitutional issue for further proceedings. Id.  
 107. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).     
 108. Id. at 511. 
 109. Id.   
 110. Justice Scalia dissented, in perhaps the least deferential opinion, arguing that in 
the absence of a formal suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the government must  
afford Hamdi a regular criminal trial. Id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a separate 
dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter disagreed with the plurality that Con-
gress had authorized Hamdi’s detention through the 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force. Id. at 540-53 (Souter, J., dissenting).     
 111. Id. at 533 (majority opinion). This holding was the impetus for Congress creating 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which themselves were challenged in the Boumediene 
case, discussed below. 
 112. Id. at 533-34. 
 113. Id. at 534. 
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ment’s contention that the Court should abstain from deciding the 
merits of Hamdi’s challenge because of separation of powers con-
cerns.114 In its brief, the government espoused a very limited level 
and scope of review over combatant status determinations made by 
the military.115 In fact, the level of deference granted to the military 
should be greater than in the usual wartime scenario, argued the 
government, since the enemy intentionally refused to wear distinc-
tive markings among the civilian population, therefore failing to dis-
tinguish themselves as combatants.116 The government also asserted 
that if the Court expanded the factual examination of combatant  
status determinations, it would negatively impair the ability of 
troops on the ground to conduct military operations, as “[a]ttempting 
to recreate the scene of Hamdi’s capture is inconsistent with the 
practical reality that the troops in Afghanistan are charged with 
winning a war and not preparing to defend their judgments in a U.S. 
courtroom.”117 Arguing further, requiring service members and allies 
to appear as witnesses for detainee status cases would not only de-
tract from the war effort in Afghanistan, but would also be “demoral-
izing” for troops.118 
 In the plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor doubted the severity of 
the risks outlined by the government. In discussing the Court’s role 
in impacting military operations, she wrote: “We think it unlikely 
that this basic process will have the dire impact on the central func-
tions of warmaking that the Government forecasts.”119 Supporting 
this assertion, Justice O’Connor wrote that the Hamdi holding only 
applied in a long-term detention scenario, and the detainee protec-
tions outlined by the plurality did not apply to immediate situations 
of apprehension on the battlefield.120 Noting that the government had 
stipulated that collecting and storing information about battlefield 
detainees was already part of military practice, the fact-finding bur-
den created by the Court’s independent-review mandate would be 
minimal, and interference with mission accomplishment therefore 
would be low.121 As to the government’s argument that military per-
sonnel would be distracted from war-fighting with the threat of  
future litigation about detention decisions, Justice O’Connor found 
                                                                                                                       
 114. Id. at 597-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 115. The government had advocated a “some evidence” standard of proof for courts 
reviewing such determinations. Id. at 598. 
 116. Brief for the Respondents at 31, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696). 
 117. Id. at 11.  
 118. Id. at 12.   
 119. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. 
 120. Id.   
 121. Id.   
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little merit because of the limited scope of the anticipated tribu-
nals.122 The narrow scope of these review tribunals—dealing solely 
with the circumstances of the detainee’s detention—would not, in her 
opinion, infringe upon military war-fighting conduct or strategy.123 
Ultimately, the military-need arguments put forth by the govern-
ment did not overcome the essential right of a citizen to meaningfully 
challenge the military’s detention determination.124 In the absence of 
an independent review process established by Congress and the mili-
tary, courts would have the authority to conduct a meaningful con-
sideration of detainees’ due process rights through habeas review.125   
 Compared to historic cases, including Korematsu, the Court in 
Hamdi seemed much more willing to involve itself in the national 
security controversy despite the separation of powers concerns.126 
Further, Justice O’Connor evinced an unabashed readiness to call the 
executive branch’s military expertise into doubt, downplaying the 
actual risk she perceived to military operations. The plurality’s pre-
scribed terms for future military proceedings also indicate a willing-
ness to get intricately involved in the conduct of the military deten-
tion program. There was almost a complete rejection of fact deference 
as it related to operational dangers. As related to the legitimacy of 
executive combatant determinations, however, the plurality seemed 
to take a balanced approach. Notable was the Court’s articulation of 
the proper level of deference to apply, which it linked to the likeli-
hood that an American citizen’s rights would be needlessly de-
prived.127 Justice O’Connor’s approach specifically counterbalanced 
                                                                                                                       
 122. Id. at 535.   
 123. Id. In outlining the Court’s role in the challenge at hand, Justice O’Connor went 
on to explain:  
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of mil-
itary authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and rec-
ognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe 
on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored 
and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like 
those presented here.  
Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 534.  
 126. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2012). 
Scheppele argues that the GWOT cases represent a watershed in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. Under the “old deference” of WWII cases, such as Korematsu, the Court generally 
erred on the side of preserving national security, permitting civil rights violations that 
would never pass constitutional muster in peace time. Id. at 96-108. Beginning with the 
GWOT cases, however, the Court took a much more active role in checking constitutional 
war powers. Despite this change in the Court’s jurisprudence, however, the ultimate practical 
effects of the GWOT cases were not overwhelmingly meaningful for the detainees. Id. at 169.   
 127. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.   
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deference to military-centric arguments against civilian rights, ulti-
mately concluding that the military justifications were not of a suffi-
cient magnitude to completely overcome the liberty rights at issue.128 
Although the Court ultimately came to a middle ground through a 
balancing of interests, making some procedural concessions based on 
military need—including the protection of classified information—the 
plurality opinion was mostly lacking in deferential language. As a 
starting point for subsequent GWOT cases, however, Hamdi was a 
relative high point of deference for the Court.   
B.   Rasul v. Bush (2004) 
 On the same day as it decided Hamdi, the Supreme Court also 
handed down the decision in Rasul v. Bush.129 At issue in that case 
was whether U.S. district courts had the jurisdiction to hear habeas 
corpus petitions from Guantanamo Bay detainees.130 In the majority 
opinion, Justice Stevens examined the history of the habeas statute 
and Supreme Court precedent.131 The Court, ultimately holding that 
district courts did indeed have jurisdiction, relied on narrow  
statutory reasoning.132 Military deference did not appear to sway the 
Court in its 6-3 holding or play even a small role in its analysis.  
Although it is difficult to judge the Court’s deference perspective in 
the case, as it was decided on narrow grounds, it is still important to 
note the lack of any mention of deference from the majority opinion. 
Not only did deference concerns not impact the majority opinion, but 
they were apparently of so little import as to not warrant discussion.   
 Dissenting in the case, Justice Scalia alleged that the majority 
misread precedent and dangerously disregarded risks that would  
ultimately burden the military.133 Indeed, the government’s brief 
                                                                                                                       
 128. See id. at 534-35.   
 129. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).   
 130. Id. at 472-73. 
 131. Id. at 473-81.  
 132. The statute at issue was 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), which allows habeas petitions 
from those who claim to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or trea-
ties of the United States.” Id. at 473. 
 133. Justice Scalia wrote: 
 Today’s carefree Court disregards, without a word of acknowledgment, the 
dire warning of a more circumspect Court in Eisentrager: “To grant the writ to 
these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the seas 
for hearing. This would require allocation for shipping space, guarding person-
nel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever 
witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those nec-
essary to defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a mat-
ter of right, would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in 
the present twilight between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war 
effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the pres-
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warned about the serious separation of powers issues inherent in  
resolving Rasul and potentially negative ramifications in intruding 
upon ongoing intelligence-gathering operations at Guantanamo 
Bay.134 For Justice Scalia, the Court’s departure from the precedent 
cases was especially troubling. According to Justice Scalia, the Court 
was essentially changing the war-fighting rules mid-game because 
the Executive relied on that precedent in creating the detention 
scheme at issue.135    
                                                                                                                                       
tige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It 
would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than 
to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to 
account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the mil-
itary offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the 
result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and mili-
tary opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.” 
Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 
778-79 (1950)).  
 134. In its brief, the government specifically linked the judiciary’s interference with 
resulting negative effects to the military’s effort to wage war on terror, stating that: 
 Exercising jurisdiction over habeas actions filed on behalf of the Guan-
tanamo detainees would directly interfere with the Executive's conduct of the 
military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters. The detention of cap-
tured combatants in order to prevent them from rejoining the enemy during 
hostilities is a classic and time-honored military practice, and one that falls 
squarely within the President's authority as Commander in Chief. 
Brief for the Respondents at 42, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334 & 03-343). The govern-
ment went on to warn that:  
 The intelligence-gathering operations at Guantanamo are an integral com-
ponent of the military’s efforts to “repel and defeat the enemy” in the ongoing 
military campaign being waged not only in Afghanistan but around the globe. 
Any judicial review of the military’s operations at Guantanamo would directly 
intrude on those important intelligence-gathering operations. Moreover, any 
judicial demand that the Guantanamo detainees be granted access to counsel to 
maintain a habeas action would in all likelihood put an end to those opera-
tions—a result that not only would be very damaging to the military’s ability to 
win the war, but no doubt be “highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”  
 More generally, exercising jurisdiction over actions filed on behalf of the 
Guantanamo detainees would thrust the federal courts into the extraordinary 
role of reviewing the military’s conduct of hostilities overseas, second-guessing 
the military’s determination as to which captured aliens pose a threat to the 
United States or have strategic intelligence value, and, in practical effect, su-
perintending the Executive’s conduct of an armed conflict-even while American 
troops are on the ground in Afghanistan and engaged in daily combat operations.  
Id. at 43 (citations omitted). 
 135. Justice Scalia wrote: 
 Departure from our rule of stare decisis in statutory cases is always ex-
traordinary; it ought to be unthinkable when the departure has a potentially 
harmful effect upon the Nation’s conduct of a war. The Commander in Chief 
and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the internment of com-
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C.   Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2009) 
 The Supreme Court considered two more landmark detainee cases 
following Rasul. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,136 Salim Ahmed Hamdan—
former chauffeur for Osama bin Laden—challenged the legality of the 
U.S. military commission process, designed to try select Guantanamo 
Bay detainees for war crimes.137 The government argued that the 
Court should apply deference in several distinct ways. As a threshold 
matter, the government submitted that the Court should apply judi-
cial comity to the case and abstain from intervening in an on-going 
military proceeding.138 In examining the arguments which would 
weigh towards abstention, the Court followed the factors from Schle-
singer v. Councilman.139 As the Court stated: “[M]ilitary discipline 
and, therefore, the Armed Forces’ efficient operation, are best served 
if the military justice system acts without regular interference from 
civilian courts.”140 This factor did not weigh in the Government’s  
favor in Hamdan, according to the Court, because Hamdan was not a 
service member, and therefore military discipline concerns did not 
apply.141 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted the Court’s seeming fail-
ure to examine other comity considerations at issue in Councilman; 
namely, whether the case involved other “military necessities” or 
“unique military exigencies,” which should weigh in the Court’s inter-
ference calculation.142 The majority viewed Councilman narrowly, 
declining to look at broader deference considerations.   
                                                                                                                                       
batants at Guantánamo Bay would not have the consequence of bringing the 
cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs. . . . For this 
Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration of 
our military commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial ad-
venturism of the worst sort. 
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 136. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).   
 137. See id. at 567-70. 
 138. Id. at 585.   
 139. 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) (holding that federal courts should not intervene in a 
criminal case when a service member has failed to exhaust his remedies in the military 
justice system).   
 140. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 586 (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 752).   
 141. Id. at 587. The Court did acknowledge that abstention may be justified in some 
future cases where, for example, detainees were seeking review of an ongoing military 
commission when that commission was convened in proximity to the battlefield. Id. at 590.     
 142. Id. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757). Justice 
Scalia noted that while the issue in Councilman was whether a military officer could be 
tried in military court for selling marijuana off base, the issue in Hamdan involved the 
petitioner “joining and actively abetting the murderous conspiracy that slaughtered thou-
sands of innocent American civilians without warning on September 11, 2001.” Id. In his 
opinion, the weighing of military necessity by the majority in Hamdan was woefully inade-
quate considering the precedent of Councilman.   
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 Interestingly, on the issue of comity, the Court found great simi-
larity between Hamdan and Ex parte Quirin.143 Quirin involved eight 
would-be German saboteurs who were captured on U.S. soil after 
traveling by U-boat and landing in Long Island, New York and Flori-
da.144 Confined and facing military commission for espionage, the 
saboteurs filed habeas corpus petitions in a U.S. district court.145  
Refusing to abstain from the case, the Supreme Court convened a 
special term to consider the case on expedited review.146 The Quirin 
Court stated that review was appropriate because:  
[I]n view of the public importance of the questions raised by [the 
cases] and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as 
well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional 
safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public 
interest required that we consider and decide those questions 
without any avoidable delay.147  
In Quirin, the Court implicitly weighed the interests of civilian rights 
with military need, determining that the countervailing liberty inter-
ests—even those of foreign nationals—overcame military arguments 
for comity.148 Likewise, the Hamdan majority found those factors 
compelling and abstention to be inappropriate in the case.   
 Turning to the merits of Hamdan’s challenge, the Court consid-
ered the legality of the U.S. military commission as designed by the 
executive branch. The procedures for military commissions, the Court 
determined, were dictated by both domestic and international law. 
The Court interpreted Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military  
Justice (UCMJ)149 as requiring that such commissions must, if “prac-
ticable,” follow the usual procedures of federal courts and be uniform 
to other proceedings under the UCMJ—namely, courts-martial.150 
Hamdan argued that the procedural rules of the commissions deviat-
ed substantially from both federal and military court procedures in 
that they permitted the accused to be excluded from the proceedings, 
                                                                                                                       
 143. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).     
 144. Id. at 21.   
 145. Id. at 18.   
 146. Id. at 19-20.   
 147. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 588 (second alteration in original) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19).   
 148. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. Considering the merits of the case, the Supreme Court 
found that the pending charges and military tribunal were constitutional. All eight Ger-
man saboteurs were convicted at military commission and sentenced to death. President 
Roosevelt later commuted two of the sentences. See Aileen Jacobson, Nazi Saboteurs in the 
Amagansett Sands, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/ 
nyregion/june-13-1942-saboteurs-land-in-amagansett-on-view-in-east-hampton.html.   
 149. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012).     
 150. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620.   
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denied access to certain evidence, and applied substantially different 
evidentiary rules.151 
 Through an executive order, President Bush determined that it 
was “impracticable” to apply federal district court rules and princi-
ples of law to U.S. military commissions.152 As to that determination, 
the Court “assume[d] that complete deference [was] owed.”153  
However, as the President never made a similar declaration of im-
practicability for the rules of courts-martial, and because the Court 
found nothing on the record which demonstrated that it would be  
impracticable to apply such rules in Hamdan’s case,154 the commis-
sions failed the requirements of Article 36. Even if the majority 
would have considered the President’s impracticality justifications as 
relevant for the purpose of diverging from federal court procedure, 
the Court stated that the security justifications found therein were 
too general.155 Because the President only noted the dangers of “in-
ternational terrorism” in broad terms, it was not sufficiently specific 
to satisfy the Court.156   
 In his dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s  
assertion that the executive branch had not announced an “impracti-
cality” need to diverge from Article 36’s requirements.157 He would 
find effective declarations made by the Secretary of Defense and  
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.158 In response to Justice  
                                                                                                                       
 151. Id. at 621.   
 152. Id. at 623.   
 153. Id.  
 154. The Court stated: 
There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in securing 
properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in applying the usual principles 
of relevance and admissibility. Assuming, arguendo, that the reasons articulat-
ed in the President’s Article 36(a) determination ought to be considered in 
evaluating the impracticability of applying court-martial rules, the only reason 
offered in support of that determination is the danger posed by international 
terrorism. Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not evi-
dent to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan’s trial, any variance 
from the rules that govern courts-martial.   
Id. at 623-24 (footnotes omitted).   
 155. Id.   
 156. Id.   
 157. Id. at 713 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 158. Justice Thomas wrote: 
On the same day that the President issued Military Commission Order No. 1, 
the Secretary of Defense explained that “the president decided to establish mil-
itary commissions because he wanted the option of a process that is different 
from those processes which we already have, namely the federal court  
system . . . and the military court system,” and that “[t]he commissions are in-
tended to be different . . . because the [P]resident recognized that there had to 
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Thomas, the majority stated that it was unwilling to grant deference 
to comments made to the media by such officials.159 Going further, 
the majority remarked that, regardless, the comments made by those 
officials were not convincing because they also lacked specificity  
regarding the dangers of using usual court-martial procedures for 
detainees and instead only articulated generalized national security 
concerns and the issue of disclosing classified material in court.160 
Those justifications were deemed inadequate, however, as the  
majority considered the deficiencies in commission procedure to far 
exceed the scope of those bases.161   
 Here, the Hamdan majority set a limit on the nature and impact 
of persuasive military needs justifications—refraining from accepting 
a “necessity” argument made to the media by defense officials—in 
addition to mandating that the justification itself have a strong  
nexus to the challenged military action at issue. In essence, the  
majority required the government to make specific connections be-
tween articulated military concerns and deficiencies in commission 
procedure. As it was, the military justifications were inadequately 
general and, therefore, not palatable for the majority.  
 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, also noted that one of 
the fundamental rights protected by military proceedings was the 
right to be present.162 Withholding judgment on whether that differ-
ence was “contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ, as disallowed 
by Article 36, the Court did state that “the jettisoning of so basic a 
right cannot lightly be excused as ‘practicable.’ ”163 In making this 
pronouncement, the Court appeared to make a comment on due  
deference, making it contingent on the individual liberty at stake. 
Because of the gravity of the individual right at issue, the required 
                                                                                                                                       
be differences to deal with the unusual situation we face and that a different 
approach was needed.” The President reached this conclusion because “we’re in 
the middle of a war, and . . . had to design a procedure that would allow us to 
pursue justice for these individuals while at the same time prosecuting the war 
most effectively. And that means setting rules that would allow us to preserve 
our intelligence secrets, develop more information about terrorist activities that 
might be planned for the future so that we can take action to prevent terrorist 
attacks against the United States. . . . [T]here was a constant balancing of the 
requirements of our war policy and the importance of providing justice for indi-
viduals . . . and each deviation from the standard kinds of rules that we have in 
our criminal courts was motivated by the desire to strike the balance between 
individual justice and the broader war policy.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).   
 159. Id. at 623 n.52 (majority opinion).   
 160. Id.   
 161. Id.   
 162. Id. at 624 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 839(c) (Supp. V 2000)). 
 163. Id. 
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showing of military need was correspondingly great.164 The Court 
thus established an apparent sliding scale of deference—where less 
deference was due, and a requirement for a showing of military ne-
cessity was high—when the government has potentially infringed on 
a fundamental liberty right.  
 In his dissent, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority’s rejec-
tion of military necessity altogether as forming the basis of the  
commissions. In criticizing Hamdan’s conspiracy charge, the majority 
stated that “[t]he charge’s shortcomings are not merely formal, but 
are indicative of a broader inability on the Executive’s part here to 
satisfy the most basic precondition—at least in the absence of specific 
congressional authorization—for establishment of military commis-
sions: military necessity.”165 The majority went on to explain that 
Hamdan’s commission was not convened by a commander on the  
battlefield, but a retired general stationed at Guantanamo Bay.166 
Further, according to Justice Stevens, the conspiracy charge was not 
grounded in any acts committed in the heat of battle or the theater of 
war, wherein the military would have a significant interest in trying 
him swiftly.167 Finally, according to the record itself and noted by the 
majority, it took the military almost three years to charge Hamdan 
after detaining him.168 These factors indicated a complete lack of exi-
gency and military need for the majority. For Justice Scalia, however, 
the majority’s view of military necessity differed remarkably from 
that of Congress and the Executive. In passing the 2001 Authoriza-
tion for the Use of Military Force, Congress authorized the President 
to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons [such as petitioner] he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided” the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001.169 Subsequently, President Bush issued an 
executive order authorizing the detention of personnel captured in 
the course of the conflict and establishing military commissions to try 
detainees for war crimes.170 For Justice Scalia, it was audacious for 
the Court to second-guess both Congress and the President on the 
                                                                                                                       
 164. The Court went on to state that the Commissions system also violated interna-
tional law—Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—because the Commissions were 
not regularly constituted courts. Id. at 632. Therefore, even if the Executive had made an 
impracticality determination in compliance with Article 36 of the UCMJ, the Commissions 
as designed would likely still have been unlawful according to the Court.   
 165. Id. at 612.   
 166. Id.   
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.   
 169. Id. at 554.   
 170. Id. at 674 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R.  
§ 1(e) (2001)). 
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issue of military necessity.171 The majority, then, had wholeheartedly 
rejected appeals to both separation of powers and military necessity 
deference. 
 The Court in Hamdan seemed to take a much less deferential  
approach to the government’s position than it had in Hamdi. For the 
majority, less deference was due because of the serious civil liberty 
concerns involved. The rejection of deference by the Hamdan Court 
appears to be at least partly a result of the length of time that the 
military had confined detainees. Justice Stevens pointedly rejected 
military necessity arguments in considering the commissions, re-
marking that Hamdan and other detainees were now distanced from 
the conflict by both time and geography.172 Comparing the result with 
the outcome in Hamdi, it seems that not only the notion of military 
necessity but the persuasive role of deference itself decreased along 
with the relative decrease in exigency and uncertainty within the 
war on terror. As a result, the majority in Hamdan gave little regard 
to those deference arguments. Even if military needs justifications had 
been valid at some point during the conflict, the bases for such justifi-
cations grew stale with time and distance. Through its analysis, the 
Court directly refuted the relevance of military necessity to the legal 
issues at hand—as the nexus between the commissions and war-
fighting itself was weak—and the appeal to deference was undermined.   
D.   Boumediene v. Bush (2008) 
 In the wake of the Court’s GWOT decisions, Congress continued 
its efforts to curtail the ability of Guantanamo Bay detainees to enter 
U.S. district courts. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 
Congress stripped away jurisdiction from U.S. district courts to hear 
habeas corpus petitions from detainees at Guantanamo Bay com-
pletely.173 In Boumediene v. Bush,174 military detainee Lakhdar 
Boumediene challenged the constitutionality of the MCA, alleging 
that it infringed on his right to habeas corpus.175 Where the holding 
in Rasul had been based on statutory habeas jurisdiction, now the 
more pressing issue of detainee constitutional habeas rights was at 
issue. The government argued that the law was constitutional be-
cause detainees held at Guantanamo Bay did not have a constitu-
                                                                                                                       
 171. Id. at 674-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 172. Id. at 612.   
 173. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified 
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950 (2012)). 
 174. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
 175. Id. at 732.   
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tional right to habeas corpus.176 Even if some limited right did exist, 
the government maintained that military tribunals established to 
determine the legal status of detainees—Combat Status Review  
Tribunals (CSRTs)177—were adequate and effective substitutes for 
habeas petitions.178  
 In determining the reach of the constitutional right of habeas cor-
pus, the five-Justice majority relied on the precedent of Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,179 a World War II-era case involving German soldiers 
who had been tried extraterritorially by the U.S. military commis-
sion. The Eisentrager Court concluded that three factors should be 
considered in determining whether a detained person held outside of 
the United States may have the right to bring a habeas petition in a 
U.S. district court: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee, and 
the sufficiency of the process that made that determination; (2) the 
nature of the location where the detention took place; and (3) the ob-
stacles that would be created if detained personnel were granted en-
titlement to the writ.180 The three-factor test on which the Court re-
lied balanced military necessity (i.e., how near to the heat of battle 
the apprehension and tribunal took place, and possible negative ram-
ifications on the mission) with the detained person’s liberties. In  
other words, whether the tribunal to determine the detainee’s status 
adequately protected those liberties.   
 It was on the third prong of the Eisentrager factors that the  
government argued most vociferously that deference to the military 
should be observed. In its brief, the government advocated an  
approach aligned with Eisentrager, in which the Court acknowledged 
that granting the writ to aliens held abroad would “hamper the war 
                                                                                                                       
 176. Id. at 739. The right of habeas corpus may only be suspended by Congress in lim-
ited circumstances circumscribed by the Constitution. The Suspension Clause states, “The 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 177. The tribunals were designed to make determinations regarding the detainees’ 
legal status—that is, if they were combatants that could be held for the duration of hostili-
ties under domestic and international law. All Guantanamo Bay detainees were eventually 
evaluated by a CSRT—unlike military commissions, which were designed to try detainees 
for war crimes and used fewer than a dozen times as of early 2017. The CSRT tribunals 
were created by Congress after the due process guidelines set forth by Justice O’Connor in 
Hamdi. Although the Boumediene Court did not directly overrule Hamdi, it is difficult to 
reconcile the two cases.   
 178. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771-72. 
 179. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the German soldiers did not have a right to 
bring habeas petitions in U.S. Courts as they had been captured in China and kept in 
German detention facilities).   
 180. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777).   
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effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.”181 Additionally, rely-
ing on Eisentrager, 
[I]t would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering of a field 
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce 
to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and di-
vert his efforts and attention from military offensive abroad to the 
legal defensive at home.182  
 While acknowledging that granting the habeas right to Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees would force the government to incur addition-
al monetary and administrative costs, as well as divert military  
personnel from important duties, the 5-4 majority did not find these 
concerns to be controlling in Boumediene. In the majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy found that the government failed to provide a per-
suasive argument that the military mission would be compromised if 
detainees were granted the habeas right.183 Focusing primarily on the 
                                                                                                                       
 181. Brief for the Respondents at 19, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-
1196). 
 182. Id. at 19-20.   
 183. The Court similarly dismissed concerns about the safety threat posed by the de-
tainees themselves, as well as the possible repercussions on American-Cuban relations:  
The Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at 
Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to 
hear the detainees’ claims. And in light of the plenary control the United States 
asserts over the base, none are apparent to us.  
 The situation in Eisentrager was far different, given the historical context 
and nature of the military’s mission in post-War Germany. . . . In addition to 
supervising massive reconstruction and aid efforts the American forces sta-
tioned in Germany faced potential security threats from a defeated enemy. In 
retrospect the post-War occupation may seem uneventful. But at the time Ei-
sentrager was decided, the Court was right to be concerned about judicial inter-
ference with the military’s efforts to contain “enemy elements, guerilla fighters, 
and ‘were-wolves.’ ”  
 Similar threats are not apparent here; nor does the Government argue that 
they are. The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay consists of 45 
square miles of land and water. The base has been used, at various points, to 
house migrants and refugees temporarily. At present, however, other than the 
detainees themselves, the only long-term residents are American military per-
sonnel, their families, and a small number of workers. The detainees have been 
deemed enemies of the United States. At present, dangerous as they may be if 
released, they are contained in a secure prison facility located on an isolated 
and heavily fortified military base.  
 There is no indication, furthermore, that adjudicating a habeas corpus peti-
tion would cause friction with the host government. No Cuban court has juris-
diction over American military personnel at Guantanamo or the enemy com-
batants detained there. While obligated to abide by the terms of the lease, the 
United States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no other sovereign for 
its acts on the base. Were that not the case, or if the detention facility were lo-
cated in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be 
“impracticable or anomalous” would have more weight. Under the facts pre-
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absence of security threats faced by Guantanamo Bay, the Court  
declined to accept a blanket—presumably unlimited by geography—
national security justification from the government. The relatively 
stable security situation at Guantanamo Bay differed markedly from 
the dangerous situation in post-war Germany, where the persons in 
Eisentrager were detained, further curbing the government’s necessi-
ty argument.184 In his dissent, Justice Scalia strongly criticized the 
majority for substituting the judgment of both the executive and  
legislative branches in matters of national security with its own.185   
 By reframing the national security concerns carried by the case as 
limited by the location of the detainees, rather than by the geography 
of the global war on terror itself, the majority undercut the govern-
ment’s military needs justification. As in Hamdan, the Court faulted 
the government’s arguments as being too general and lacking a basis 
in both gravity and exigency. Although military personnel may be 
burdened by being heralded into U.S. district court as a result of a 
detainee’s constitutional right to review, the Court did not consider 
that to impact the overall military mission substantially. It was  
convinced neither by administrative and financial burdens on the 
military nor by arguments that granting the right to detainees would  
seriously injure the morale of troops.186 In short, contrary to the gov-
ernment’s contentions, the majority found that allowing detainees’ 
recourse in U.S. courts did not actually pose substantial or pressing 
risks to military operations.   
 The Court did not completely neglect the deference arguments put 
forth by the government, however, and went on to caveat its holding 
for reasons of military necessity. For one, if the detention facility at 
issue were located more closely in proximity to a theater of war, or if 
                                                                                                                                       
sented here, however, there are few practical barriers to the running of the 
writ. To the extent barriers arise, habeas corpus procedures likely can be modi-
fied to address them. 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769-70 (citations omitted).   
 184. Id.   
 185. According to Justice Scalia: 
The Court today decrees that no good reason to accept the judgment of the oth-
er two branches is “apparent.” “The Government,” it declares, “presents no 
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be com-
promised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.” 
What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of Con-
gress and the President on such a point? None whatever. But the Court blun-
ders in nonetheless. Henceforth, as today’s opinion makes unnervingly clear, 
how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch 
that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails. 
Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 186. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.   
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the Executive faced some kind of domestic exigency, the Court  
expressed an openness to more heavily weigh a military deference 
argument from the government.187 Furthermore, the Court stated 
that reasonable time should be granted to the military in cases in-
volving foreign citizens who are detained abroad, and a U.S. district 
court should decline to entertain such a case in the immediate after-
math of detention.188 Moreover, in its initial screening and detention 
determination, the government is due strong deference.189 In consid-
ering future cases, continued the Court, an important factor is 
whether there are secondary processes available that meaningfully 
check the government’s power.190 Deference did play an influential 
role, then, in the Court offering the government some forms of future 
leeway in acting in conformity with the its ruling.   
 After concluding that Guantanamo Bay detainees did, in fact, 
have the constitutional right to habeas corpus, the Court also held 
that the CSRTs established by the military were not effective substi-
tutes for habeas petitions.191 The CSRTs did not guarantee detainees 
the assistance of counsel, the government’s case was granted a pre-
sumption of validity, detainees were limited in calling favorable  
witnesses, and the tribunal itself did not offer the full array of proce-
dural outcomes that a habeas petition could.192 Justice Kennedy made 
a nuanced pronouncement of what habeas hearings must entail for 
these persons, however, and allowed some compromises in order to 
reduce the burden that such proceedings would place on the military. 
Accommodations may include consolidation of habeas claims to one 
U.S. district court and established procedures to limit the dissemina-
tion of classified information.193 These accommodations, however, did 
not appear to resolve the issue of requiring active duty military wit-
nesses to appear in court—perhaps having been pulled from the field 
of battle—a problem argued by the government in its brief and sub-
sequently emphasized by Justice Roberts in his dissent.194   
 In dicta, the Court went on to describe, in sweeping terms, the 
balance between judicial review and national security. In examining 
its own role in maintaining this balance, the Court also focused on a 
                                                                                                                       
 187. Id. at 770.   
 188. Id. at 793.   
 189. Id. at 793-94. 
 190. Id. at 779.  Although the MCA allowed detainees recourse in filing reconsideration 
petitions with the D.C. Circuit Court, the petitions would offer a level of review which was 
less comprehensive than habeas.   
 191. Id. at 792.   
 192. Id. at 783-84.   
 193. Id. at 795-96.   
 194. See id. at 816 (Roberts, J., dissenting).   
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third consideration—individual liberty. The Court stated that while 
national security depends upon the military, it is also dependent on 
personal liberty and freedom from erroneous deprivations of  
freedom.195 In evaluating its own judicial role as an important ele-
ment of national security and ultimately as a check to the other two 
branches, the Court emphasized the importance of taking into  
account the individual liberty at stake. Again, the Court considered 
individual rights as underpinning its determination to override the 
Commander in Chief and Congress, granting them little separation of 
powers deference in the process.      
 In explaining why the Court was not usurping or undermining the 
role of Commander in Chief, the majority noted that within the con-
stitutional separation of powers structure, the judicial authority to 
hear challenges to executive determinations of combatant detention 
were both supremely “legitimate” and “necessary.”196 That power was 
even more essential because Boumediene had been in custody for 
over six years.197 Not only was individual liberty at stake, but the 
magnitude of that liberty’s deprivation was substantial and long-
lasting. This fact was important to the Court in resolving the separa-
tion of powers issue in the national security arena.198 Again, the 
Court emphasized the importance of individual rights when consider-
ing the degree of deference due to the Executive.   
 Taken as a whole, the GWOT cases show a general unwillingness 
by the Court to avoid the merits of national security cases because of 
separation of powers concerns. The level of deference granted to gov-
ernment arguments was issue- and fact-specific, but several princi-
ples emerged. The level of relative deference given to both Congress 
and the military appeared to shrink when the nexus to exigency was 
low, and also when the individual rights at issue were serious. Most 
importantly, however, the Court showed a consistent practice of 
closely examining the “military need” facts offered by the govern-
ment, particularly as they related to war-fighting concerns, often  
ultimately disagreeing with the national security risks involved and 
the likelihood of harm to military operations.   
                                                                                                                       
 195. Id. at 797.   
 196. Id.   
 197. Id.   
 198. Previously in the decision, the Court appeared to hint that it took umbrage at the 
fact that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay had been utilized for the very purpose 
of evading judicial review. See id. at 765-66.   
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E.   Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional  
Rights, Inc. (2006) 
 The doctrine of military deference was also at issue in several cas-
es involving matters far removed from the war on terror. The Court 
reaffirmed its own commitment to military deference apart from the 
context of detainee rights in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & In-
stitutional Rights.199 In that case, the Forum for Academic and Insti-
tutional Rights (FAIR)—an association composed of law schools and 
law professors—challenged the constitutionality of the Solomon 
Amendment.200 The Amendment required institutions of higher 
learning to give equal campus access to military recruiters and other 
employers or face a loss of federal funding.201 Although the Solomon 
Amendment allowed exemptions for institutions with a long-standing 
tradition of pacifism based on religious beliefs, it was otherwise uni-
versally reaching. Alleging a First Amendment violation, FAIR  
argued that the Solomon Amendment forced institutions to choose 
between freely exercising their right to decide whether to accommo-
date, and sometimes disseminate, a military recruiter’s message or 
receive federal funding.202 The group was primarily concerned with 
the military’s former “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” program, which violated 
many school antidiscrimination policies.203   
 Beginning its discussion on the constitutionality of the Solomon 
Amendment, the unanimous Court204 cited Rostker, stating that “ ‘ju-
dicial deference . . . is at its apogee’ when Congress legislates under 
its authority to raise and support armies.”205 Although Congress 
chose to control military recruiter access on campuses through its 
spending power rather than through direct legislation, in the Court’s 
view, this fact did not reduce the degree of deference due to  
Congress.206 In fact, the Court concluded that the requirements out-
                                                                                                                       
 199. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 200. Id. at 53. 
 201. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000). The original law stated only that schools must allow mili-
tary recruiters access to their campuses. However, following Department of Defense inter-
pretation and practice, Congress amended the statute to require equal treatment between 
military recruiters and other employment recruiters. See H.R. REP. No. 108-443, pt. 1, at 6 
(2004). Under the statute, if even one part of a university—such as a law school—refused to 
allow recruiters equal access, the entire university would lose funding. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) 
(2012).     
 202. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 53.   
 203. Id. at 68.   
 204. Justice Alito did not take part in the decision.   
 205. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 58 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).   
 206. Id. at 58-59.   
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lined in the law could have constitutionally been mandated by  
Congress, even absent its spending power.207 
 In general, the Court stated that the Solomon Amendment regu-
lated conduct and only incidentally impacted speech.208 Although 
schools might be required to send e-mails and print flyers advertising 
a recruiter’s presence, as it would do these things for another em-
ployer, the inherent speech elements would be only incidental to the 
conduct.209 Moreover, according to the Court, this situation was not 
similar to precedent cases where the Court found “forced speech” as 
objectionable, such as forcing a student to pledge allegiance to the 
flag,210 or mandating that a Jehovah’s Witness display a religiously 
offensive message on a license plate.211 In fact, positioning FAIR in 
line with those First Amendment cases, wrote the Court, had the  
potential to trivialize the serious freedoms protected by those prece-
dents.212 In any case, the law did not dictate the content of speech 
and did not result in a requirement that schools endorse a specific 
message.213 Importantly, noted the Court, schools were free to express 
opinions contrary to military policy.214 Disagreeing with a central  
argument put forth by FAIR, the Court also stated that schools could 
not comply with the law by equally excluding all employment  
recruiters that violated school nondiscrimination policies.215 
 In the lower ruling, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the Solomon Amendment’s burden on speech was greater than  
necessary to further the government’s interest in military recruit-
ing.216 The Third Circuit reasoned that the military had alternative 
means to accomplish its goal, such as loan repayment programs and 
media advertisements.217 In response, the Supreme Court first dis-
agreed with the Third Circuit’s legal standard, stating that an inci-
dental burden on speech was permissible as long as the neutral law 
promoted a substantial government interest that would be achieved 
                                                                                                                       
 207. Id. at 59. 
 208. Id. at 62.   
 209. Id. 
 210. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the 
First Amendment prohibited schools from forcing students to recite the pledge of allegiance).   
 211. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire could 
not force residents to bear a license plate with the state motto “Live Free or Die”).   
 212. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62.   
 213. Id. at 65.   
 214. See id.   
 215. Id. at 56.   
 216. Id. at 67. 
 217. Id. 
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less effectively without the regulation.218 Here, the law promoted the 
substantial government interest in raising and supporting the Armed 
Forces, and the law added to the effectiveness of military recruit-
ment.219 Then, disagreeing with the outcome of the Third Circuit, the 
Court stated that the fact that there may be other adequate ways of 
raising an army and providing for a navy was a separate question and 
a judgment best made by Congress, not the judiciary.220 The Court ul-
timately upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment.   
 Although the unanimous Court referred to military deference at 
the outset, the opinion is not clear on how or to what degree defer-
ence was influential in its holding. The legal test used by the Court 
in Rumsfeld, as well as other incidental speech infringement cases, 
came from another military case in which deference was used.221  
Notably, Rumsfeld involved the free speech interests of institutions, 
rather than individuals. The Court also stressed the idea that uni-
versities possessed the meaningful choice to violate the terms of the 
law and face loss of federal funding. The individual liberty interest at 
stake in the case, then, was quite limited.   
F.   United States v. Alvarez (2012) 
 Conversely, the Court did not favor military deference arguments 
in another recent First Amendment case where more serious individ-
ual rights were implicated, United States v. Alvarez.222 During a  
municipal board meeting in California, new board member Xavier 
Alvarez falsely stated that he was a retired Marine and had been 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.223 Alvarez was later con-
victed in federal court for violating the Stolen Valor Act of 2005,224 
which made it a crime to falsely represent having been awarded any 
military decoration or medal.225 In his appeal, Alvarez argued that 
                                                                                                                       
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (first citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13; then citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981)).   
 221. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).   
 222. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 223. Id. at 713-15.   
 224. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2013).   
 225. The law stated, in relevant part: 
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR 
MEDALS––Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writ-
ing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for 
the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, im-
prisoned not more than six months, or both.  
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his lie was protected speech under the First Amendment, and there-
fore, the portion of the Stolen Valor Act under which he was convict-
ed was unconstitutional.226 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals  
reversed his conviction.   
 In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government relied heavily 
on the U.S. military’s strong interest in prohibiting deceptive speech 
about military awards.227 The law itself listed congressional findings 
that outlined specific concerns regarding false decoration claims:  
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.  Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Fraudulent claims surrounding the receipt of the Medal of Hon-
or, the distinguished-service cross, the Navy cross, the Air Force 
cross, the Purple Heart, and other decorations and medals awarded 
by the President or the Armed Forces of the United States damage 
the reputation and meaning of such decorations and medals. 
(2) Federal law enforcement officers have limited ability to prosecute 
fraudulent claims of receipt of military decorations and medals. 
(3) Legislative action is necessary to permit law enforcement officers 
to protect the reputation and meaning of military decorations and 
medals.228 
 In addition to harming the prestige and recognition due to current 
service members and veterans, the government argued that false 
award representations had pernicious effects on the operation of the 
military. Citing testimony of a high-ranking military official before 
the House Armed Services Committee, the government contended 
that false representations of that kind undermined “morale, mission 
accomplishment, and esprit de corps within the military.”229 In detail-
ing its compelling interest in the law, the government also asserted 
that the integrity of the military awards program was perhaps even 
more essential during times of conflict because such decorations  
encouraged brave deeds and helped sustain troops in the face of per-
sonal loss.230 Noting why the Stolen Valor Act was necessary to  
                                                                                                                                       
(c) ENHANCED PENALTY FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING CONGRESSION-
AL MEDAL OF HONOR.––(1) IN GENERAL––If a decoration or medal in-
volved in an offense under subsection (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of 
Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that subsection, the offender shall 
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.  
18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 226. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715.  
 227. Brief for the United States, Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (No. 11-210). 
 228. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2013). 
 229. Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 14. 
 230. In its brief, the government contended: 
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accomplish the government’s goal in protecting the integrity of the 
awards system, the government cited Congress’s findings that fraud-
ulent claims about the receipt of military decorations damage the 
reputation of those decorations.231 The government thus offered strong 
“military needs”-based deference justifications to the Supreme Court.   
 The Court considered these claims in its opinion, but in a 6-3 deci-
sion ultimately held that the charged provision of the Stolen Valor 
Act was an unconstitutional limitation on speech. In a plurality opin-
ion joined by three other Justices, Justice Kennedy stated that the 
Act amounted to a content-based restriction on speech and that  
deception was not one of the several discrete categories of traditionally 
nonprotected speech.232 As to the content-based strict scrutiny analy-
sis, although the government’s interest in ensuring the respect and 
esteem of service members was “beyond question,” the regulation ul-
timately did not pass muster under exacting scrutiny.233 Strict scru-
tiny required the government to not only prove a compelling  
interest but also to prove that the restriction was actually necessary 
to achieve its interest.234 The government, according to the plurality, 
failed to prove that false claims such as those made by Alvarez  
actually tended to dilute the perception of military awards in gen-
eral.235 A common-sense causal link, articulated by the military and 
endorsed by Congress, was not sufficient for the Court. The plurality 
                                                                                                                                       
 The award of military honors is particularly important during wartime. For 
instance, as General George C. Marshall wrote in describing his advocacy dur-
ing World War II for the creation of the Bronze Star, the medal would be used 
to “sustain morale and fighting spirit in the face of continuous operations and  
severe losses.” Indeed, the importance of medals in fostering these values 
among service members has been recognized since the very first honors were 
created. General Washington, in establishing the first valor award, explained 
that it would “cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well as . . . foster 
and encourage every species of military merit.” Similarly, when Congress  
created the Medal of Honor during the Civil War, the bill’s sponsor explained 
that the provision “need[ed] no explanation,” as creating the honor would  
ensure that “the men in Navy shall be encouraged to brave deeds,” and would 
be more effective in that regard than promotions and other incentives. 
Id. at 38-39 (citations omitted).   
 231. Id. at 6. 
 232. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716-22 (2012). 
 233. Id. at 725-26. The Court also concluded that the government did not use the least 
restrictive means to accomplish its objectives. Id. at 729-30. Specifically, Congress could 
have directed the creation of a database that could be used to cross-check claims of military 
decorations. Id. The dissenting Justices, citing the Office of Undersecretary of Defense, 
Report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on a Searchable Military 
Valor Decorations Database, stated that such a system would be impracticable. Id. at 743-
44 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 234. Id. at 725.   
 235. Id. at 725-26. 
178  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:137 
 
suggested that intentional counter-speech condemning false claims of 
military valor could result in satisfying the governmental interest.236  
Moreover, wrote Justice Kennedy, because the awarding of high-level 
honors such as the Medal of Honor, for example, was accompanied by 
media coverage and great acclaim, the risk of false claims being be-
lieved was actually low.237 In making this holding, the Court rebuffed 
the significance of the congressional finding of fact noted above; 
namely, that false claims are a legitimate problem and do indeed 
damage the reputation and perception of military decorations.   
 According to the plurality, there was no general exception to First 
Amendment protection for false statements.238 The plurality declined 
to include false claims of military decorations with other categories of 
false speech that it had deemed unprotected in previous cases be-
cause those categories all included some form of cognizable harm.239 
Where defamation, fraud, false commercial speech, and other exam-
ples all carried the consequences of legally recognized harm—such as 
invasion of privacy or tending to cause unnecessary litigation—the 
plurality was not persuaded that stolen valor incidents resulted in 
similar harm.240 Moreover, according to Justice Kennedy, stolen  
valor claims were not tantamount to perjury, which had the potential 
to undermine the integrity of the judicial system.241 Nor were the 
negative effects of stolen valor of a comparable magnitude to crimes 
of falsely impersonating a government officer, which tended to deni-
grate the integrity of government processes.242 The plurality suggest-
ed that Congress could enact a more narrowly tailored law that 
would only ban falsehoods intended for monetary or other tangible 
gain.243 The above analysis and suggestions show that the plurality 
implicitly rejected another of the government contentions—that false 
                                                                                                                       
 236. Id. at 725-29.   
 237. Id. at 727-29. Justice Kennedy did not explain how this line of reasoning would 
apply for the great majority of lesser medals that are awarded by the military, however.   
 238. Id. at 716-18 (“This comports with the common understanding that some false 
statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in pub-
lic and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.”).   
 239. Id. at 718-20.   
 240. Id.   
 241. Id. at 720-22.   
 242. Id.   
 243. Id. (noting a history of such laws in the country such as criminal fraud). Indeed, as 
a result of Alvarez, Congress passed the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, which limited criminal 
liability for falsely claiming military medals only to higher-ranking and combat-related 
decorations, such as the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and only 
when the claim was made for material gain. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 704 (2013).   
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statements about military decoration have measurable adverse  
effects on military operations, equivalent to a material harm.244 
 In a separate concurring opinion joined by Justice Kagan, Justice 
Breyer stated that the Stolen Valor Act failed to pass intermediate 
scrutiny, as it was not adequately tailored to achieve its objective and 
operated to cause disproportionate constitutional harm.245 Recogniz-
ing that many statutes throughout history had made certain false 
statements unlawful, Justice Breyer caveated that those statements 
were always accompanied by specific categories of harm: when harm 
was to identifiable victims; when tangible harm to others was espe-
cially likely; and when a certain type of lie was particularly likely to 
produce harm.246 Again, the concurring Justices rejected the notion 
that military valor lies cause significant harm, warranting inclusion 
in one of those categories—despite the congressional testimony of 
military officials to the apparent contrary.   
 In these two recent cases, the Court appeared to resort to military 
deference when the law at issue had only an incidental effect on indi-
vidual rights (e.g., the Solomon Amendment), but declined to rely 
heavily on deference when the law had a potentially strong impact on 
individual rights and the nexus to military operations—at least in 
the Court’s opinion—was low. As in the GWOT cases, the majority of 
Justices were willing to evaluate the military necessity contentions 
made by the government and deemed them unpersuasive.   
V.   CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE APPLICATION 
 A careful examination of the modern Supreme Court cases shows 
several trends. First, in general, the Court has not been sympathetic 
to calls by the government to either abstain from deciding the merits 
of individual rights cases or use a markedly lowered level of review, 
justified by “separation of powers” deference concerns. Most im-
portantly, this review reveals a tendency on the part of the majority 
of sitting Justices to closely evaluate the government’s articulated 
military need arguments and the facts underlying those justifica-
tions. In Boumediene, for example, Justice Kennedy unflinchingly 
rejected the idea that the Court’s holding would significantly hamper 
military operations in the theater of war. Likewise, in Alvarez, the 
                                                                                                                       
 244. Conversely, courts have, for example, upheld laws criminalizing impersonation of 
a government officer, even when the defendant did not have fraudulent intent or receive 
anything of value. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 699 F.2d 177, 178-80 (4th Cir. 1983). 
Congress’s goal in passing the law criminalizing impersonation of a government officer was 
not only to prevent fraud, but also to maintain “the general good repute and dignity” of 
service to the government. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943).  
 245. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
 246. Id.     
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Court stated that Congress’s finding of military valor harm as deni-
grating the public perception of military decorations was not  
adequately supported. The Court has shown a readiness to judge the 
merits of the government’s military need arguments and dismiss 
them as being not likely, not germane, or of insufficient importance 
to be persuasive. This is true even when the arguments were  
endorsed by legislative findings, as they were in Alvarez. Not only 
were underlying facts themselves fair game for the Court, but the 
nexus between those alleged facts and the resulting need for judicial 
deference was frequently rejected.  This was true even when the gov-
ernment’s argument declared a threat to military operations and 
war-fighting abilities. In Hamdan, for example, the plurality 
acknowledged the military operational concerns before the Court but 
noted that the link between the military commissions at issue and 
the claimed operational needs in the GWOT conflict were weak. In 
considering the nexus between military need and the legal issue at 
hand, exigency was a primary concern in the Guantanamo cases, es-
pecially as the military’s involvement in the war on terror became 
prolonged. 247 In general, when the nexus to military need was low, so 
was the level of deference.   
 Frequently, Justices specifically judged the persuasiveness of mili-
tary deference arguments as inversely related to the relative weight 
of the individual rights at issue. This trend did not appear to be lim-
ited to war-time cases, as the Court showed a similar willingness to 
dissect the government’s military deference arguments in Alvarez, 
pitting them against serious First Amendment concerns. When seri-
ous civil liberty deprivation was anticipated, generalized concerns 
about national security and the interruption of military operations 
were not persuasive for the majority of Justices.   
 The modern Court has shown a pattern of reduced deference in 
both “flavors” of military deference, as compared to the Court in  
Rostker. In applying these general principles to a future challenge to 
the MSSA, the most significant effect is in the Court’s willingness to 
challenge not only the basis of military need and national security-
type justifications, but its readiness to closely examine the actual  
severity, immanence, and likelihood of such operational concerns. 
This applies to not only arguments made by the government in  
                                                                                                                       
 247. In an interesting article, Israeli legal scholars trace the decline of military defer-
ence shown by the Israeli Supreme Court during an extended period of hostilities (1990-
2005). The authors posit that the decline is due to several factors, including repeated expo-
sure to unnecessary infringement by the military on individual liberties and a loss of mili-
tary urgency which undermines deference arguments. Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, 
Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished Deference to the Military: Lessons from Israel, 
35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919 (2010). 
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general, but also specifically includes congressional findings as well 
as military testimony. It is impossible to predict, with any degree of 
certainty, the actual arguments that would be presented to the Court 
in a future challenge to the MSSA. Based on modern precedent, how-
ever, the majority of Justices would not hesitate in taking a hard look 
at the evidence submitted on behalf of military needs justifications in 
assessing the adequacy and importance of those arguments in a due 
process analysis. A poorly defended appeal to military “flexibility,” for 
example, would likely not pass muster with the modern Court.   
 Also, based on recent cases, the use and extent of military defer-
ence is likely to be contingent on the gravity of the individual rights 
at issue. The liberties at stake in the all-male MSSA are serious and 
far-reaching. As noted previously, draftees served in large numbers 
during multiple conflicts during the twentieth century. At a high 
mark, conscripts made up approximately 62% of the American force 
in World War II, where over 290,000 total U.S. service members died 
in action.248 In Vietnam, the last instance of conscripted service, 
draftees comprised more than 25% of total American troops,249 where 
American troop battle deaths totaled over 47,000.250 Individual inter-
ests are not limited to war service, however. Men who fail to register 
with the Selective Service, as required by the MSSA, face potential 
criminal penalties,251 as well as a loss of various privileges, including 
access to federal job training and student financial assistance,252 civil 
service appointments,253 and U.S. citizenship.254 Many states also tie 
eligibility to state financial assistance and the ability to attend in-
state colleges and universities to the registration requirements of the 
MSSA.255 Because of the great civil liberty concerns at issue, it is like-
ly that the Court would use a limited version of judicial deference.   
 Although the above analysis has been limited in scope to the 
Court’s treatment of civilian rights vis-à-vis a call for military defer-
                                                                                                                       
 248. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AMERICA’S WARS FACT SHEET (2017), 
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7QMM-RZZW] (listing total American troop numbers for each conflict).   
 249. Id.    
 250. Id.   
 251. See 50 U.S.C. § 3811(a) (2012). There have been no prosecutions for failing to reg-
ister with the Selective Service since 1986. KAMARCK, supra note 14, at 18. 
 252. Enforcement of Military Selective Service Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 748  
§ 1113 (1982).  
 253. 5 U.S.C. § 3328 (2012). 
 254. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).   
 255. The Selective Service System maintains a list of state penalties by jurisdiction. 
See Other Legislations by States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, SELECTIVE SERV. 
SYS., https://www.sss.gov/Registration/State-Commonwealth-Legislation/Other-Legislations 
[https://perma.cc/M52M-GYWU] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).   
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ence, it is also instructive to how the Court may treat future litiga-
tion involving service members.256 Such likely future cases may  
involve challenges to the Feres doctrine257—which effectively bars ac-
tive duty service members from suing the federal government in tort 
actions, most significantly in medical malpractice claims—as well as 
to military rules that inhibit certain religious practices.258 This Arti-
cle’s analysis is particularly instructive when Congress and the mili-
tary disagree on an issue, as it indicates the high degree to which the 
Court would examine the deference justifications and factual asser-
tions of each. 
                                                                                                                       
 256. The Court has never articulated a different standard for military deference in 
cases of civilian versus service member rights, although some authors have called for such 
a distinction. See, e.g., Oberwetter, supra note 44, at 196-201. As the Court has not consid-
ered a service member rights case in years, it is difficult to predict whether its treatment 
would differ substantially from the cases discussed above.  
 257. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that the government was 
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence leading to the serious injury or 
death of three service members).   
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 420 (2016) (holding that a Marine 
superior’s orders to remove bible verses from a work area was lawful, and that appellant 
failed to assert a prima facie defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). As the military is now under a strict scrutiny standard of review 
for religious expression and accommodation cases involving service members, the issue of 
the scope of service member free religious exercise under the First Amendment appears 
generally ripe for judicial review. See DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION, NO. 1300.17, ACCOMMO-
DATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES (2009), 
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130017p.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K9HA-N5M4] (incorporating statutory changes from RFRA).  
